جستجوي پيشرفته | کتابخانه مجازی الفبا

In this article, I try to examine the works of Jürgen Habermas about discourse ethics, the issue that he has developed from Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1983) to Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1992). Habermas argues, contrary to philosophies of the subject, that his theory of communicative action and his works on discourse ethics are intersubjectives. Thus truths are not anymore personal, but rather the fruit of a consensus among people under discussion. Habermas distinguishes also between private and public spheres and thinks that his works on discourse ethics give equal attentions to individual as well as to society. I’ll try in this article to examine the validity claims of Habermas’s theory about discourse ethics to see if he grants equal interests to individual as he does to society. In other words, I’ll ask Habermas’s works if individual is not forgotten, as such, under the social intersubjective actions. Is Habermas’s ethical discourse is a symmetric one, and does it care, on the whole, about the difference? This is the main question of this article. I start by defining the distinction drown by Habermas between ethics and moral. Secondelly, I try to focus on his main works about discourse ethics especially on Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1983) and Justification and Application (1991). Thirdly, I find useful to compare Habermas’s ethical theory with some of its philosophical resources such as the works of Karl-Otto Apel, of Kant, and of Hegel to understand better his moral thoughts. Finally, before the conclusion, I study the relationship between moral and law in two of Habermas’s major works on the theory of law: Tanner Lectures (1986) and Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1992). In these two books, I attempt to answer the question: why Habermas has reduced in Between Facts and Norms … the important of the role of ethics within the system of law.

Abstract This paper attempts to study the place of ethics in Derrida’s works. We tray in this article to deal, firstly, with the hypothesis about an ethical-turn in deconstruction in 1990s. Thus we trace the place of ethics in the first works of young Derrida to see if he indeed had deconstructed ethics problems in his early texts. After this introduction we, secondly, read carefully the texts in which he treats ethics problematic directly and obviously manner. We analyze how the father of deconstruction problematizes the questions of ethics such as the problem of hospitality, of gift, and of promise. We try, thirdly, to find how Derrida makes-use, but critics in the same time the works of Kant, Kierkegaard and Levinas while we attempt to explain what he means by the ethics of im-possible, the possibility of the impossibility, and the tension between possible and impossible, conditional and unconditional, limited and unlimited, etc. ملخص باللغة العربية نحاول في هذه الدراسة أن نتناول الحيز الذي تشغله الأخلاق في تفكيكية الفيلسوف الفرنسي/الجزائري جاك دريدا. سنعمل في البداية على التحقق من الفرضية التي تقول بوجود تحوّل أخلاقيّ في تفكيكية دريدا، تحولٌ بدأ منذ بداية التسعينيات من القرن المنصرم. هكذا سنشرع في استقصاء حضور المشاكل الأخلاقية في كتابات دريدا الشاب للتحقق ما إذا كان قد اهتم وتناول بالتفكيك في أعماله الأولى مفاهيم وإشكاليات تنتمي كلاسيكياً إلى فلسفة الأخلاق وموضوعاتها. ثم سنعمل بعد ذلك على دراسة النصوص التي تناول فيها دريدا الكهل بعض المسائل الأخلاقية بشكل واضح ومباشر. هكذا فإننا سنبحث في كيفية تناول وأشكلة عراب التفكيكية لبعض المفاهيم والمسائل الأخلاقية من قبيل الضيافة والعطية والعفو والوعد... أخيراً سنحاول إظهار كيفية استفادة دريدا النقدية من أعمال بعض الفلاسفة الذين سبقوه في تناول مسائل أخلاقية محددة، أسماء مثل كانط، كيركيجارد، وليفيناس وكيف ميّز بين أخلاق الممكن وأخلاق المستحيل، الأخلاق المشروطة والأخلاق اللامشروطة، الأخلاق المحدودة والأخلاق اللمحدودة الخ مبرزاً ذلك التوتر بين هذه الثنائيات ومؤكداً أن التفكيك هو أخلاق المستحيل...